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SUPPLEMENTAL BUT NOT EQUAL: 
REPLY TO DELL'OLIO ON FEMININE 
LANGUAGE FOR GOD 
John W. Cooper 
This paper addresses central issues in the debate about inclusive language for 
God by responding to Andrew Dell'Olio, who offered biblical, theological, lin-
guistic, and ethical reasons for a "supplemental" use of feminine language for 
God. Since he leaves unclear whether "supplemental" means "secondary to" 
or "fully equal to" the masculine language of the biblical tradition, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether he makes his case. While a secondary role for femi-
nine language for God is legitimate, I argue that giving feminine language a 
status equal to the Bible's masculine language for God is not warranted by the 
standard biblical and theological criteria of the Christian tradition. 
Andrew Dell'Olio's "Why Not God the Mother?"! challenges several com-
mon arguments against calling God "Mother:" that the Bible does not do 
so; that Jesus did not do so; that "Father" has a special linguistic status that 
the Bible's feminine imagery does not share; that using Mother language 
leads to pantheism. He uses a number of standard arguments to defend 
"the supplementary use of feminine language for God, including the term 
'Mother-God'" (p. 193): that Scripture itself contains feminine language for 
God; that certain religious experiences can warrant "Mother" as a supple-
ment to "Father;" that using only masculine language is tantamount to 
idolatry because God is ontologically ungendered; and that failure to use 
feminine language for God perpetuates sexism. 
But Dell'Olio's article suffers from a significant ambiguity in "the sup-
plementary use of feminine language for God." I will argue that it is per-
missible for faithful Christians to refer to God supplementally as "Mother" 
in certain ways and in certain contexts, but that we are not warranted by 
traditional Christian criteria in making "Mother" equal to "Father" in fre-
quency of use, in linguistic status as a primary title, or in its role in reli-
gious and liturgical discourse. 2 
1. The Meaning of "Supplemental Feminine Language" 
Two broad and importantly different positions are currently debated. One 
regards feminine language for God as supplementary but secondary. It holds 
that "Father" and the rest of the biblical tradition's masculine vocabulary 
for God should remain the primary language of the Christian faith, but 
that "Mother" and other feminine references may sometimes be used in 
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secondary ways to "supplement" it.1 The other position insists that femi-
nine language is supplementary and equal! "Mother" is just as appropriate 
as "Father" as a primary title or name for God in Scripture, the Triune 
Name, liturgy and worship, the Creeds, and in all Christian discourse. 
Most advocates of inclusive language for God (whom I call "inclusivists") 
are aware of the supplemental but secondary position and reject it, insist-
ing on fully egalitarian inclusivism.5 Although Dell'Olio is not clear on 
which understanding of "supplementary" he means to defend, the argu-
ments he uses and most of the writers to whom he appeals advocate fully 
egalitarian inclusivism, a position that I do not think can be warranted by 
the standards of historic Christianity. 
II. Revelation and Religious Experience as 
Warranting Sources of Language for God 
How has ecumenical Christianity (Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and 
Protestant) understood revelation and extra-canonical religious experience 
as sources and warrants of language for God? This issue arises when 
Dell'Olio charges Elizabeth Achtemeier with limiting our language for God 
to the (masculine) language of the Bible (p. 194) and faults Donald Hook 
and Alvin Kimel for privileging the words of Jesus, who called God 
"Father" (pp. 197-99). He points to terms such as "Trinity" and "Perfect 
Being" as evidence that Christian tradition has not limited itself to the 
words of Jesus or the Bible. He appeals to divine revelation in creation and 
to post-biblical religious experience as legitimating sources of Mother lan-
guage for God (p. 200). 
Dell'Olio is surely correct to invoke natural revelation or natural knowl-
edge of God and religious experience as traditional sources of language for 
God. But historic Christianity also acknowledges the definitive status of 
special or supernatural revelation as proclaimed in apostolic tradition and 
recorded in Holy Scripture/ embracing it as the final criterion by which 
claims about God's identity and purposes made by theologians, mystics, 
philosophers, and other religions are to be interpreted, evaluated, and cor-
rected. The particularities of supernatural revelation are not reduced to the 
more general content of creational revelation or natural theology. 
Religious experience is not accorded the status of special revelation. 
According to the traditional view, therefore, our verbalization of the 
motherly qualities of God revealed in nature and apprehended in religious 
experience cannot share the foundational status of the language of super-
natural revelation. At most Mother language can be supplemental in a sec-
ondary way. The God who mothers us and the whole creation is the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, named by Jesus and witnessed in Scripture 
(Matt. 28:19). Questions about Dell'Olio's arguments for Mother language 
arise because he does not rank and relate revelation and religious experi-
ence the traditional way but seems to regard natural revelation, supernat-
ural revelation, and religious experience as roughly equal sources of lan-
guage for God. 
Dell'Olio affirms Scripture as revelation, but is hesitant to regard its 
naming of God as historically definitive. He warns against making 
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straightforward final appeals to the Bible regarding language for God 
because all interpretation is finite, fallible, self-interested, and liable to be 
patriarchal (p. 204) and because the Scriptures "are God's word revealed 
through human beings' evolving, and limited, historical consciousness" (p. 
205). While these points warrant caution, generations of biblical inter-
preters have taken account of them but do not share Dell'Olio's reluctance 
to view Scripture as the final authority on the names of God. 
He also reverses the traditional order between biblical language and 
philosophical theology when he appeals to God's ontological genderless-
ness as the standard by which to correct the masculine language of the bib-
lical tradition, which allegedly promotes a "form of idolatry" (p. 205). In 
historic Christianity, awareness of God's transcendence moved the faithful 
to embrace Scripture as God's gracious verbal self-disclosure, not to rela-
tivize it. Accordingly, the church did not eliminate or augment the mascu-
line language of God as Father even though it soon recognized that God is 
not ontologically masculine or male.7 It used insights from philosophical 
theology to help interpret the language of Holy Scripture, to articulate 
what it means that the one ungendered God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, 
but not to alter or replace biblical language, as inclusivism insists. 
Dell'Olio's view of religious experience in relation to Scripture likewise 
seems to be more broad and egalitarian than the traditional view. He 
appeals to the experience of early Christian gnostics (p. 200, nAO) and 
Mary Baker Eddy (the founder of Christian Science), who are outside of the 
orthodox Christian tradition, as possible legitimating "initial baptisms" of 
"Mother" as a name for God (p. 200). Against Hook and Kimel, who 
would limit such legitimation to the witness of Scripture, he claims "there 
need only be some reference-fixing path from the names to God, regardless 
of how that reference originally got fixed" (p. 200). 
Dell'Olio may be correct about the sheer linguistic possibility of refer-
ring to God in new ways. Someone could just stipulate that she will refer 
to the God Christians call "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" as "Ms. X" or 
"The Big Guy in the Sky." But what is linguistically possible is not neces-
sarily legitimate. His unqualified appeal to experiential authorization 
seems to overlook the historic distinction between special revelation and 
post-canonical religious experience. This move not only places the God-
talk (and therefore the theology) of the Gnostics and Mary Baker Eddy on 
the same level as that of Matthew, John, and Paul. By implication it also 
legitimates the Heavenly Father and Mother of Joseph Smith and the onto-
logically masculine-feminine God of Rev. Moon (Unification Church), 
alleged experiential revelations of God that likewise trace their reference-
chains back to the Bible. 
Christianity is rich with language for God that has come from philo-
sophical reflection, religious experience, and the religious imagination: 
Great Designer, bright burning Tiger, and Hound of Heaven. But this lan-
guage remains secondary to and defined by the language of the Bible. It is 
not the standard coin of Christian worship, piety, and faith. The same 
should hold for Mother language derived from natural revelation and reli-
gious experience. 
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III. Feminine Language for God in Scripture 
But Dell'Olio also invokes special revelation. He asserts that "there are 
numerous Biblical examples of the use of feminine language to describe 
God ... which may then serve as a basis for the use of certain feminine terms 
(like 'mother') in connection with God since such terms are consistent with 
the feminine language that is used" (p. 195). To test his appeal we must 
examine both the number and linguistic status of the Bible's feminine refer-
ences to God. 
There are fewer than two dozen reasonably tenable feminine references 
to God in the Bible, all of them figures of speech, many of them implied or 
indirect, and most of them in the Old Testament.s Some inclusivists claim 
that there are many more instances that have been lost in translation or 
suppressed. Many argue that important divine names, such as "EI 
Shaddai," and basic personal terms for God, such as "Spirit," are feminine. 
When subjected to standard exegesis, however, most of these assertions 
simply do not stand Up.9 
Dell'Olio provides an instructive example (p. 203), the common claim 
that Paul's sermon to the Athenian philosophers contains an image of God 
as a pregnant mother: "in him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 
17:28). This suggestion might seem plausible until one discovers that the 
source of Paul's quote is a hymn to Zeus by Epimenides the CretanlO and 
was almost surely neither intended nor heard as a divine womb metaphor. 
Many inclusivist claims about feminine language for God in Scripture tum 
out like this one. 
Nevertheless, there are genuine biblical feminine figures of speech for 
God. At issue is whether and how they present God as Mother. Dell'Olio 
writes: "if one finds maternal predicates ascribed to a subject, as is the case 
in certain Biblical descriptions of God, it would seem that one is within 
one's linguistic rights to refer to God as 'Mother'" (p. 197). His hypothesis 
may be true, but his conclusion is mistaken because his analysis of the orig-
inal text and its figurative language is incomplete. 
What is overlooked can be illustrated from his own repeated example, 
Deuteronomy 32:18: "you forgot the God who gave you birth" (NIV). It is 
true, as he claims, that the verb is properly translated "gave you birth" and 
therefore maternal in meaning. But that does not give us the right to infer 
that God, the subject, is Mother. For the grammatical form of this verb is 
masculine, reflecting that its subject is explicitly masculine. "God" is El, 
who is Yahweh ("the Lord" in verse 19; cf. "Father" in 6). In Hebrew these 
divine names are not only grammatically but also personally masculine. 
This is the case with all the divine names and standard personal titles in 
the Old and New Testaments. ll 
What we have in Deuteronomy 32:18 is actually a case of cross-gender 
imagery, a kind of trope in which a feature normally associated with one gen-
der is figuratively predicated of a person of the other gender.12 Other exam-
ples are "Saddam is the mother of all dictators," "Sally is bull-headed," Jesus 
as a mother hen (Matt. 23:37), nursing at the breasts of kings (Isa. 60:16 
NRSV), and Paul in childbirth (Gal. 4:19). It turns out that all the feminine 
references to God in the Hebrew and Greek Bible are cross-gender images. n 
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Because they are cross-gender images, the feminine figures of speech in 
the Bible no more linguistically warrant "Mother" as a primary name or 
title for God and "She" as an appropriate pronoun than feminine imagery 
warrants these terms for Saddam, Jesus, or Paul. By Dell'Olio's own crite-
rion, therefore, using "Mother" and "She" as linguistically equivalent to 
"Father" and "He" is not "within the linguistic rights" of inclusivists, since 
it is not "consistent with the feminine language that is used." However, 
biblical usage surely does warrant feminine language for God in a sec-
ondary, supplemental, figurative sense. 
IV. Names, Figures of Speech, and Language for God 
The distinction between names, titles, and appellatives on one hand and 
figures of speech on the other deserves further comment. Almost all dis-
cussions of gendered language for God fatally confuse two different mean-
ings of "figurative" or "metaphorical" language: the "figurative" or 
"metaphorical" nature of human language generally in relation to the tran-
scendence of God; and the distinction within language for God between 
the "figurative" or "metaphorical" parts of speech and the non-figurative 
parts of speech. What results is a completely fallacious argument from 
feminine imagery to feminine names for God. 
The first meaning reflects the commonplace that our language cannot 
literally describe or define God as it does creatures since he transcends 
creaturely categories. Thus language for God is said to be "symbolic," 
"analogical," "metaphorical," "figurative," or something similar, and sev-
eral theories of how language meaningfully refers to and asserts truth 
about God have been devised. Because of divine transcendence, "Father," 
"Lord," "King," and all the other biblical terms for God share this symbol-
ic, analogical, figurative, or metaphorical quality. 
It does not follow, however, (and here is the fallacy of equivocation) that 
"Yahweh" "God," "Father," "King," and the other primary biblical terms 
for God are metaphors or any other figure of speech in the second meaning 
of "figurative/metaphorical." Standard linguistic analysis classifies these 
terms as proper names, titles, and (non-figurative in this sense) predicate 
nouns or appellatives. Dell'Olio perpetuates this confusion by following 
Sally McFague's treatment of "Father" and "Mother" both as metaphors 
(pp. 196, 200). 
Lack of clarity about names, titles, and metaphorical meaning also 
clouds his response to Hook and Kimel, who (correctly) classify "Father" 
in the New Testament as "a designating title ... which functions like a prop-
er name in its unique referentiality." Dell'Olio charges that their appeal to 
Kripke's view of a proper name as a rigid designator is confused because 
they regard "Father" as bearing metaphorical significance descriptive of 
God, whereas Kripke holds that "names are not descriptions" (p. 201). 
But Kripke's view of proper names does not rule out their having 
descriptive meaning in addition to their essential function as rigid designa-
tors and is therefore consistent with Hook and Kimel's analysis of 
"Father." Hook and Kimel are working with a standard biblical and theo-
logical notion of "name" as a unique personal reference that (typically) 
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bears meaning, a definition that does not imply a strong distinction 
between a proper name and a title. Consider some examples: "Immanuel" 
is a name that means "God with us" (Matt. 1:23). In Isaiah 9:6 the name 
(shem) of the coming son of David is "Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, 
Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace." A name (onoma) of Jesus Christ in 
Revelation 19:13 is "The Word of God" and in verse 16 his name is "King 
of kings and Lord of lords." Technically all of these cases are titles and are 
descriptive, but they are regarded as names in Scripture. The same is true 
of "Father," universally regarded in the theological tradition as the name 
(nomen proprium) of the First Person of the Trinity,14 as well as the most per-
sonal title of the one God (1 Cor. 8:6). 
Hook and Kimel are correct that there are no feminine names for God of 
this sort in Scripture. And we have indicated why there is no linguistic 
momentum in the Bible's feminine imagery that would accord "Mother" a 
status equal to "Father" as this sort of divine title or name. Adding 
"Mother" as a primary term for God to the biblical-traditional reference 
chain is therefore an arbitrary act unwarranted by the tradition of Scripture. 
Furthermore, even if we could successfully refer to the God of the Bible 
by attaching "Mother" to the historical reference-chain, as Dell'Olio asserts, 
it cannot have equal status precisely because "Father" is not merely a rigid 
designator but the bearer of revelational meaning that "Mother" does not 
share. One definitive significance, for example, arises from the messianic 
covenant with David (2 Sam. 7:12-16), where God declares himself a father 
to David's royal sons forever. This messianic theme develops in the Old 
Testament (e.g., Ps. 2:6-7, Isa. 9:6-7) and culminates in God's Father-Son 
relationship with Jesus (e.g., Lk. 1:32). This theme is then explicated and 
refined into the Triune Name, invoked by Jesus himself and given to the 
church for all the world to acknowledge (Matt. 28:19). The feminine 
imagery of Scripture lacks this meaning as well as the linguistic function of 
personal designation. It simply cannot be equivalent to the Bible's primary 
(masculine) language. 
V. Orthodoxy and Feminine Language for God 
Prof. Dell'Olio questions whether biblical language is necessary for main-
taining orthodoxy, responding specifically to the concern that Mother lan-
guage leads to pantheism. He does not raise the equally important issue of 
trinitarian heterodoxy. 
I agree that Mother-language does not imply heterodoxy in a conceptu-
ally or propositionally necessary way. But the traditionalists' point is not 
primarily that the propositional content of Mother-language is unequivo-
cally pantheistic or that it entails heresy. They worry more that its personal 
and imaginative associations within the complex dynamics of human spiri-
tuality, unrestrained by supernatural revelation, push in the direction of 
heresy or false religion. They note a significant correlation in the world 
religions between mother goddesses and pantheism, paganism, and con-
temporary neo-paganism. They know that theologians who promote 
inclusive language for God frequently also hold kinds of panentheism that 
make God's involvement in the world part of the divine nature or neces-
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sary for its self-realization. ls Furthermore, traditionalists note how fre-
quently those who hold unorthodox doctrines of the Trinity and 
Christology (e.g., Gnostics, Shakers, Christian Science, Mormonism, and 
Moon's Unification theology) speak of the divine as both masculine and 
feminine. Whatever the spiritual-cultural-conceptual dynamics behind 
these correlations, opponents of inclusivism worry that the content of the 
faith would diminish in truthfulness if feminine language were given full 
equality in Scripture, the Creeds, the liturgy, and Christian discourse. 
There is a way for users of feminine language to remain Christian in the 
biblical-traditional sense: simply to state up front that "Mother" refers to 
God as presented in Scripture and historically confessed by the church. 
This is the intention of many who use inclusive language. The crucial 
point, however, is that this approach implies a "supplementary but sec-
ondary" view of feminine language, acknowledging that the (masculine) 
language of Scripture and tradition is definitive of the meaning and doctri-
nal content of the Christian faith. 
VI. Idolatry, Sexism, and Biblical Language for God 
Dell'Olio agrees with Elizabeth Johnson that using only masculine lan-
guage for God is both oppressive to women and idolatrous (p. 205). 
Traditional Christians must reject this allegation if only because it implies 
that the Bible and God himself, its primary author, are sexist and promote 
idolatry. A response is not difficult, because he commits the fallacy of con-
fusing use and abuse, throwing out the baby of biblical language with the 
bath of idolatry and sexism. I claim that the language of Scripture is 
redemptive, not oppressive. 
Inclusivists insist that feminine language for God and inclusion of 
women are necessarily correlative: they stand or fall together. A better 
approach to the problem of sexism in Christian tradition is to reject this 
correlation and return to the language of God and justice for humans as 
found in Scripture. According to the Old Testament, Elohim created male 
and female together in his image. Yahweh the King loves and demands 
justice for all, especially the poor and oppressed, widows and orphans. 
According to the New Testament, God Almighty promises to be a Father to 
his sons and daughters (2 Cor. 6:18). We all have the privileged status of 
children and heirs of God through Jesus Christ the Son, in whom there is 
neither male nor female (Gal. 3:28). Scripture's language for God is mascu-
line and at the same time the Bible promotes general human equality, jus-
tice, and flourishing for men and women alike. (This claim can be defend-
ed whether or not Scripture allows the ordination of women, as I think it 
does.) Given the pattern of gendered language in Scripture, it is unneces-
sary and mistaken to make full inclusion of humans dependent upon 
inclusive language for God.16 
Inclusivism seems more likely to be guilty of the sin of idolatry than the 
biblical-Christian tradition, if it consists in worshipping humanly con-
structed ideas about God instead of God as he has revealed himself. A bet-
ter solution to the temptation of idolizing the masculinity of God is to 
remind ourselves what the church has always taught: the masculine lan-
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guage for God in Scripture does not mean that God is ontologically mascu-
line. In short, the abuses of biblical-traditional language for God are better 
addressed by a return to its proper use than by adopting egalitarian gen-
der-inclusive language for God. 
VII. Conclusion 
Questions about the nature and content of divine revelation and their rela-
tion to human religious practice have philosophical aspects and raise philo-
sophical questions. But they are not primarily philosophical. We Christian 
philosophers need the help of ecclesiastically rooted biblical scholars, the-
ologians, linguists, and liturgists to discuss the issues competently. 
But even participation of scholars from other disciplines will probably 
not settle the debate. For we come from different parts of the Christian tra-
dition and find ourselves at home with more traditional or more modern 
expressions of the faith and understandings of its sources and warrants. 
Even after thorough interdisciplinary discussion, we may not come to 
agreement on the nature and content of Holy Scripture or the status of the 
Nicene Creed or the weight of extra-biblical religious experience. And if 
we do not agree on these issues, we are unlikely to agree about appropriate 
language for God. My motive in responding to Prof. Dell'Olio is to make 
clearer some of the hermeneutical and theological issues that are unavoid-
ably connected with inclusive language for God, whatever our personal 
conclusions. 
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is signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father." 
15. John Cobb and David Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory 
Exposition (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), pp. 9-10 and 61-62, emphasize 
that their dipolar theology cuts against the traditional view of God as "exclu-
sively male" in favor of a balanced masculine-feminine view. The panentheis-
tic theologies of Sally McFague and Rosemary Ruether also come to mind. See 
McFague, "God and the World," in Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, 
Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), pp. 59-90, where she follows process 
theology in viewing the world as "God's body." And see Ruether, Sexism and 
God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon, 1983), pp. 48-49 and 86-
92, where she designates Godl ess as "Primal Matrix" [matrix from mater, Latin 
for "mother"). 
16. It is surely legitimate to wonder why God revealed himself in exclu-
sively masculine language. Defenders of biblical language sometimes hypoth-
esize that this language is essential to a proper understanding of the Creator-
creature relation or of the Trinity, or perhaps that it is God's best strategy for 
communicating in a sinful patriarchal world. But these are only pious guesses. 
In the end Christians accept this language because it is God's self-naming, not 
because we understand and approve of God's reasons for it. Surely there is no 
injustice to humans in how God has revealed himself, and there is no incom-
patibility between the divine names and justice among humans. 
